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Ties That Bind?: Children's Attorneys, Children's
Agency, and the Dilemma of Parental Affiliation
William A. Kelf

I.

INTRODUCTION

"But you're supposed to be working for us!"

-Delia, a child client'
Another day at the attorney's office and Delia, your twelve year old
client is upset. Delia is a bright, articulate sixth-grader whom the
family court found to be neglected, after her parents allegedly hit
Delia's oldest sister, Zelda, with a belt, buckle-side down. The family
court removed Delia and Zelda from their home for a few weeks and
placed them with their maternal aunt, whom the girls' parents now
refer to as "traitor." The parents, poor and African-American,
expressed hope that your appointment as Delia's new lawyer would
finally bring some justice to a proceeding they deem fraught with error
and racism. The family court based its finding of neglect of Delia and
Zelda almost solely on the medical evidence of Zelda's bruises.
Delia is upset because you have told her that you do not think you
can support her parents' motion to dismiss the finding of neglect.
Against your better judgment, you previously advocated for Delia's
return home following the fact-finding, because there was no evidence
of maltreatment toward her and you viewed Delia as possessing
adequate decision-making ability to take direction from her.2 You also
* Visiting Senior Lecturer, Cornell University Law School. Special thanks to
Kathryn Abrams, Nancy Cook, Bob Seibel, Tom Grisso, Fran Olsen, James Garbarino,
Resa Lieberwitz, Aviva Orenstein, and Glenn Stone for their many and insightful
comments.
1. The following hypothetical is based on a compilation of cases in which the author
represented child clients as a law guardian in upstate New York.
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") instruct that "[a] lawyer
shall abide by client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ....
and
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are pursued." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983). But see id. Rule 1.14(a) (explaining a
course of action when the attorney finds the client to have impaired decision-making
ability). For purposes of this writing, this Article will use the Model Rules, which 37
states have adopted as of 1994. There are, however, important differences in the Model
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recognized that Delia desperately missed her parents and had
continually fought with Zelda while at her aunt's residence. Zelda
wants to remain with her aunt permanently, and Delia's parents have
consented to a transfer of legal guardianship.
Despite the neglect finding, Delia now wants the Department of
Social Services ("DSS") "totally out" of her life, and she is against any
court-ordered parenting classes, caseworker visits, or counseling for
the family. You have just received her parents' attorney's motion to
dismiss, which would result in the precise outcome your client has
directed you to pursue. Although Delia listened and participated with
great acumen during your counseling session with her regarding what
to do with the dismissal motion, Delia disagrees with your risk
assessment of having no further state oversight in her life.
Admittedly, such assessments, at least those of adults, are subject to
reasonable differences of opinion. This is especially true in this case,
where your client claims she has not been subjected to the same
punishment, and there is no other alleged history of parental abuse
against her. However, what weight, if any, should the child's
assessment be accorded in this situation, given that you previously
decided this assessment was sound enough to follow when you
advocated for her return home? Should you now allow Delia to test
out her assessment of the risk on her own, with no DSS oversight?
Thinking quickly, you take a break with a copy of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") under your arm. You
emerge less troubled, and with a solution. Relying on the Model
Rules, you have concluded that parental pressure has impaired Delia's
decision-making ability to such an extent that you must now act as a de
facto guardian for her "best interests." 3 Although you recognize that it
will be difficult to explain to Delia why you will be unable to follow
her direction, you can proceed with some comfort that you are on solid
ethical ground, and that Delia will hopefully understand "in time."
After all, she is a pretty mature kid.
One of the most difficult dilemmas for any child advocate occurs
when the client wants her attorney to advocate for something against
her best interests, and when the client's choice may be attributable to
Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) ("Model Code"), which still governs in a
minority of states.
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, supra note 2, Rule 1.14(a), (b) cmt. 2
(explaining that if a client suffers from a disability such that she cannot act in her own
interest, and that person has no guardian or legal representative, the lawyer must act as
the de facto guardian).
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parental affiliation.4 Whether this affiliation manifests itself through
identification, protective instincts, trust, love, placation, or parental
pressure, the attorney must decide the extent to which her client can
direct the litigation as an agent free from parental influence. The
simplest approach, described above, is for the child's attorney to treat
affiliative behavior as a substantial impairment under Model Rule 1.14,
and then to proceed as the child's de facto guardian.5 A similarly easy,
but purer, approach would be for the attorney to request appointment
of a guardian ad litem ("GAL") to protect the child's best interests,
allowing the original attorney to continue representing the child's
expressed wishes.6
Neither approach, however, directly considers the issue of whether
the child can ever have agency,' or whether the law should treat her as
4. The act of "affiliation" is: "[t]o adopt or accept as a subordinate associate [orl Itlo
associate (oneself) as a subordinate, subsidiary, or member with . . . [or] to associate or
connect oneself." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 29 (3d
ed. 1992). The definition also includes reference to legal proceedings whereby a child's
biological connection to a father is demonstrated. See id. Some have also referred to
this phenomenon with respect to children as a form of "attachment." Attachment is "lal
bond of affection or loyalty [or] fond regard." Id. at 118.
5. See supra note 2 (discussing Model Rule 1.14). Current scholarship examining
ethical issues and child representation have generally used the term "impairment" to
denote a child who is incapable of making informed decisions. This Article will
continue, reluctantly, to utilize the term while calling for the creation of less
stigmatizing ways of describing child decision-making and competencies. Similarly,
Anne Coughlin identifies the need for less pejorative language in calling for the
revision of the concept of battered women's syndrome. See Anne Coughlin, Excusing
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 89-91 (1994) (criticizing the manner in which is currently
utilized as battered women's syndrome as a defense when it implies that these women are
psychologically disabled, self-sacrificing, and subordinate to men, thereby reinforcing
gender stereotypes).
6. This approach would usually require an additional expenditure of state funds for
assigned counsel. As such, judges are likely to be reluctant to appoint a guardian ad
litem for a child who is already represented by counsel, even though this approach might
provide the child with representation more consistent with her needs.
7. The concept of "agency," sometimes referred to as "self-direction," has been
recently examined in the ways that law and society recognizes or restricts women's
choices. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the interrelationship
between women's lives, culture, and law); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 304 (1995) (exploring the role of feminist legal theory in highlighting and
enhancing women's agency under circumstances of oppression); Michelle Oberman,
Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY, 15 (1994) (challenging the assumptions underlying statutory rape laws
by contrasting legal principles governing adolescents and psychosocial literature
regarding adolescents). According to Professor Abrams, different manifestations of
agency are seen in examining decision-making behavior, self-assessments of power or
choice, as well as resistance to the influence of others. With regard to children, social
scientists have examined agency under each of the above conditions, particularly with
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having agency when a child is closely affiliated with a parent. In
addition, neither approach examines the nature of that agency, or the
accompanying ramifications posed by the attorney's duty of loyalty to
the child client.8 From my practice, the absence of such guidance
encourages children's attorneys to dismiss or seek to alter their clients'
expressed wishes whenever the child seems to be making a decision
with another person in mind. This automatic equation of affiliation
with undue influence demeans children and ignores the fact that
children and adults are both social creatures, who often make decisions
based on their affiliations with others. This Article offers some
guidance to children's attorneys in sorting out when children's agency,
exercised in the context of their affiliations with others, should be
respected. Respect for children's decision-making power by their
attorneys would promote important public interests, such as, (1)
encouraging children to make decisions and take responsibility
commensurate with their developing abilities, and (2) to develop more
realistic conceptions of children as both dependent and decisionmaking individuals with their own identity. 9
regard to the influence on children's decision-making exerted by parents or peers. See,
e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995) (challenging the use of a model for
comparing adolescent and adult decision making by policy researchers that is based on
informed consent); David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise
Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 431 (1991)
(comparing the ability of children and adolescents to give informed consent to medical
treatment); Kim White, et al., Adolescents' Compliance-Resistence: Effects of Parents'
Compliance Strategy and Gender, 24 ADOLESCENCE 595 (1989) (discussing resistance
strategy of adolescents when faced with compliance-gaining attempts by parents).
8. This Article examines parent-child affiliation only in the context of attorney-child
client relationships. Those who support the expanded use of guardians ad litem argue
that GALs are more effective at advocating for a child's interests, given the child's
affiliation with a parent, because the GAL's client is essentially the child's best
interests, not the child herself. The nonexistence of a GAL's duty of loyalty to follow
the child's directives would likely make irrelevant the question of the child's agency to
formulate such directives. See Emily Buss, "You're My What?:" The Problem of
Children's Mis-Perceptions of Their Lawyer's Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1732
(1996). However, the GAL's lack of allegiance to the child and the resulting wider
discretion creates a serious risk of having the child discounted as a potential contributor
of information and guide to the "best interests" analysis, regardless of the child's
competence. See generally Proceedingsof the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children-Reportof the Working Group on the Allocation of
Decision Making, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325, 1325-37 (1996) (providing an analysis
of some of the ethical issues involved in the allocation of decision-making power
between clients and advocates). This source also directs the reader to reports of other
working groups and companion articles contained in the published material from this
conference. See id. at 1325.
9. See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A FeministApproach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24 (1986).
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II. EXAMINING CHILD-PARENT AFFILIATION
Examining the extent to which a child can freely direct an attorneyclient relationship requires an initial look at how parent-child
relationships develop. Parent-child relationships have strong
developmental and dynamic components.'0 A child's relationship with
her parent is traditionally characterized by the gradual development
from emotional and economic dependence to greater levels of
independence." Similarly, the relationship is usually marked by the
child's strong identification with one parent or both at a young age,
and with greater rebellion and self-definition asserted by the child
beginning around adolescence. 2 Attention to the power dynamics
operating between a parent and child is essential because exercises of
power do not always run in one direction-that is, from parent to
child. 13 Throughout the development of the parent-child relationship,
there is the possible manifestation of pathology or possible disruption

10.

See generally Joanne L. Benn & James Garbarino, The Developing Child in a

Changing Environment, in JAMES GARBARINO, ET AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 99-127 (1982); ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-74

(W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2d ed. 1963) (discussing developmental stages through
adolescence); James Garbarino, The Child's Evolving Capacities, in CENTER ON
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ABA, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 19-32 (Cynthia Price Cohen &

Howard Davidson eds., 1990).
11. See William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive
Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 896 (1989);
John P. Hill & Grayson N. Holmbeck, Attachment and Autonomy During Adolescence, 3
ANNALS OF CHILD DEV. 145, 149-50 (1986); White et al., supra note 7, at 595.
generally ERIKSON, supra note 10, at 247-74.

See

12. See also Hill & Holmbeck, supra note 11, at 158-59 (detailing past research and
studies on adolescent rebellion); White et al., supra note 7, at 595 (examining
adolescent behavior in response to parental influence). See generally ERIKSON, supra
note 10, at 247-63 (discussing developmental stages through adolescence). It should be
noted that such rebellion or resistance to influence by others is treated as one
component of "agency." See generally Abrams, supra note 7, at 304-07 (describing how
feminists' anti-pornography movement has obscured the study of women's sexuality);
Mahoney, supra note 7 (discussing the interrelationship between women's lives,
culture, and law); Oberman, supra note 7, at 70-79 (challenging the assumptions
underlying statutory rape laws by contrasting legal principles governing adolescents
and psychosocial literature regarding adolescents).
13. See generally Gary W. Peterson, Parent-Youth Power Dimensions and the
Behavioral Autonomy of Adolescents, I J. ADOLESCENT RESEARCH 231, 233-34 (1986)
(recognizing the possibility that adolescents may acquire power in the parent-youth
relationship); James L. Turk, Uses and Abuses of Family Power, in POWER INFAMILIES
80, 91-92 (Ronald E. Cromwell & David H. Olsen eds., 1975) (suggesting that children
have "considerable impact on family choices"); White et al., supra note 7, at 595
(describing strategies used by adolescents to resist compliance with parents' demands as
varying with the gender of the adolescent and parent).
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of family affiliations because of death, divorce, or other causes. 4
Both child and parent tend to assign varying amounts of importance to
the relationship over its lifetime, which is sometimes manifested in the
amount of respect or deference exhibited in their interactions.' 5
With the possible exception of the developmental aspects described,
it should be noted that each of the above characteristics may also
describe any adult relationship with, for example, a friend, lover, or
mentor. Not surprisingly, the strength of these affiliations can be
equal to, or even stronger than, that between a parent and child. As
discussed infra, this is one reason why the law's treatment of this
affiliation, as potentially impairing only a child's decision-making
abilities, appears open to question.
III.

MANIFESTATIONS OF AFFILIATION

Children's affiliation with their parents can take many different
forms, any of which can trigger the attorney's impairment "radar."
There are the most obvious forms of overt parental pressure, such as
physical brutality, sexual exploitation, threats, fear-mongering, and
quid pro quo solicitations. 6 Threats can range from an actual parental
promise of physical harm to the child or the parent, to loss of love or
respect by the parent, or to other more subtle coercive messages. 7
Parental pressure raises the question of whether, in a dysfunctional
parent-child relationship, the child's mere understanding of the parent
and the past consequences of the child's behavior might create an
atmosphere of ongoing threat.' 8 For example, a child who witnessed
14. See ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS 165, 196-207 (1968) (providing
examples of pathology in identity development). See generally ERIKSON, supra note 10,
at 406-14.
15. See Hill and Holmbeck, supra note 11, at 181 (postulating that the parent-child
relationship is continually transforming throughout its existence); White et al., supra
note 7, at 609-11 (discussing the various strategies used by adolescents to resist
compliance in light of their gender).
16. See Boyd C. Rollins & Darwin L. Thomas, A Theory of Parental Power and Child
Compliance, in POWER IN FAMILIES 38, 40 (Ronald E. Cromwell & David H. Olsen eds.,

1975) (describing bases of "potential influence or power in social relationships" as
applied to parent-child relationships) (citing J.R.P. French, Jr. & B.H. Raven, The
Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER (D. Cartwright, ed. 1959)); Arlene
Skolnick, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 314-50

(1973) (discussing historical influences on parent-child relationships); T.E. Smith,
Foundationsof Parental Influence upon Adolescents: An Application of a Social Power

Model, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 860 (1970)).

See generally Richard J. Gelles & Murray A.

Straus, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 78-84, 79 (1988).

17. See Rollins & Thomas, supra note 16, at 40; Skolnick, supra note 16, at 314-50.
See generally Gelles & Straus, supra note 16.
18. Cf. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 93.
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her parent's rage at the revelation of an initial child abuse report could
reasonably perceive that any further disclosures about abuse would
result in a similar or more serious reaction. Thus, it is consistent with
the nature of the child-parent relationship (or possibly any intimate
relationship) that the child could experience the existence of parental
pressure without having actually received a specific confirmation,
verbally or otherwise, that a threat exists.' 9
Both fear-mongering" and quid pro quo solicitations 2 take
advantage of what may be the child's diminished power or ability to
assess the value of parental advice or bargaining.22 Thus, a parent can
intimidate a child by providing information about his or her present or
future well-being by describing, for example, the likelihood of foster
care placement if the child acts undesirably. The parent can increase
the power of the threat by using information known about the child's
fears to highlight potential dangers, for example, by suggesting that
the child will likely be more seriously abused while in foster care.
Finally, the parent can offer to bestow certain material or emotional
benefits, or to refrain from harming the child or himself, in exchange
for the child's cooperation. Of course, if the need is great enough, a
child (or any adult for that matter) may not have the ability to enter
such a bargain of her own free will, nor hold a position to enforce
such a bargain if the parent reneges. Again, past interactions between
the parent and child can operate to create, in the child's mind, a real
perception of the existence of a quid pro quo agreement, even without
overt confirmation by the parent. 23
There are other acts of parental affiliation by the child that may
reflect an imbalance of power in the opposite direction, that is, when
the child's decisions appear motivated by a desire to protect, reward,
or rescue the parent. 24 This form of "role reversal," as well as the
19. See id.; see also Gelles & Straus, supra note 16, at 67-68; Skolnick, supra note
16, at 289-96.
20. "Fear- mongering" refers to the information conveyed by a parent to a child with
intent to elicit a fear response from the child, which may coerce the child either to take
or refrain from some action consistent with the parent's desires.
2 1. "Quid pro quo solicitations" refer to an exchange of promises offered by a parent
to a child. Such offers are, of course, common in all parent-child relationships. Some
offers, however, may rise to the level of parental pressure when the consideration in
question is something the child desperately needs (e.g., nurturance, food or protection),
and the child perceives the parent as the only source of satisfaction.
22. See White et al., supra note 7, at 598; see also Rollins & Thomas, supra note 16,
at 40.
23. See Skolnick, supra note 16, at 289-96; see also Gelles & Straus, supra note 16,
at 78-84.
24. See Linda Burkett, Parenting Behaviors of Women Who Were Sexually Abused as
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excessive use of parental power described above, each have potentially
serious detrimental effects for children. 25 As in the case of "parental
pressure" described above, attorneys tend to be cognizant of the
potential harms of such affiliative behaviors when they appear to be
influencing the child to choose a course of action contrary to the
child's best interests.26 Thus, when the attorney perceives an instance
of faulty decision-making by the child client, and attributes it to a
power imbalance in the parent-child relationship, the attorney is most
likely to find "impairment" and proceed to advocate for the child as a
de facto guardian.27
Children in their Families of Origin, 30 FAMILY PROCESS 421, 430-34 (1991) (detailing
role reversal in children of previously abused mothers, who are more parent-focused);
Janet Johnston, 1989 Role Diffusion and Role Reversal: Structural Aberrations in
Divorced Families and Consequences for Children's Functioning 1-20 (visited Nov. 17,
1997) <http:\\erl l.ulib.iupui.edu/egi-bin/webspirs.egi>.
25. See Burkett, supra note 24, at 432-33; Johnston, supra note 24, at 1-20; see also
Gelles & Straus, supra note 16, 84-88; Skolnick, supra note 16, at 289-96. It should be
noted that more benign forms of "role reversal" are present in all families, where family
members draw emotional support from each other commensurate with their abilities. In
particular, it is hard to imagine how families of multiple children could function without
some amount of "parental" supervision transferred temporarily to a capable older sibling
to look after a younger sibling. However, such assumptions of a parental role can be
taken to extreme, with potential harm to both older and younger siblings. See, e.g.,
Leaving 2 Home Alone, Parents Are Held, N.Y. TIMES (late edition), Dec. 30, 1992, at
A 10 (reporting on children taken into state custody when two young children were left to
fend for themselves for several days while parents vacationed in Mexico).
26. In such instances, an attorney might still be able to take direction from the client
by trying to discern what the child would have wanted, but for the parental pressure.
This process of determining "substituted judgment" has been used with adults who are
deemed incompetent due to mental disability or medical condition. See Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). Similarly,
with a child, a substituted judgment inquiry would look for evidence of the child's prior
unimpaired decision-making. See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 315. Unfortunately, unless the
child is already in her teens, such an inquiry would have little history to draw from.
However, the child could have, for example, confided in a counselor or teacher about her
thinking prior to the application of parental pressure. This highlights again the
importance of developing collaborative relationships between children's attorneys and
mental health or educational professionals. See generally Donald N. Duquette,
Collaboration Between Lawyers and Mental Health Professionals: Making It Work, in
FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 489 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing a model for
collaboration in child welfare cases involving consultation and information sharing
while protecting client confidentiality).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.14. There are a
number of alternative models for parent-child affiliation, power dynamics, and how
these effect child decision-making. See Peterson, supra note 13, at 233-35; Rollins &
Thomas, supra note 16, at 40; White, supra note 7, at 596. A psychoanalytic model
would describe parent and child consciousness as each having three components, the
Parent, Adult, and Child, roughly corresponding to the Freudian ego states of Superego,
Ego, and Id. See ERIC BERNE, TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: A
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Until this point, the foregoing discussion has focused on some of
the most pathological, harmful, or overt forms of parent-child
affiliation, against which most attorneys would respond by taking
protective measures on a child client's behalf. However, what about
parent-child affiliation that seems to spring from the more socially
desirable aspects of intimacy, for example, a child's expressions of
loyalty toward or identification with a parent, or a child's expressions
of self-sacrifice on the parent's behalf? In its most basic form, how
should an attorney evaluate children's decisions governed by love or
respect for a parent? What if those decisions do not appear sound or
consistent with the attorney's perceptions of the child's best interests?
Attorneys have used these decisions, also stemming from relational
behavior, to find impairment where they wish to override a child's
choice. The child's attorney's tendency to discount these
manifestations of "family ties" is particularly problematic in light of the
attorney's duty to try to empower the client consistent with her level of
competence.'
IV. MATURE DECISION-MAKING
So how can an attorney discern whether the child client can
adequately make decisions and "act in his own interests?"29 How
should attorneys begin to figure out whether their child client's
SYSTEMATIC INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY,

23-24, 31-36 (1961). The Adult

mediates urges from the Parentto conform with norms established by parental and other
authority figures, and urges form the Child to act more spontaneously in the pursuit of
basic needs of nourishment, pleasure, and protection. Because under this model it is
assumed that children basically have internalized their parents' views and power
directives, this model suggests the presence of substantial emotional barriers
discouraging thoughts or behavior that might contradict or harm parental interests.
Under a psychoanalytic model it might be questionable whether a child (either as a minor
or adult) could ever demonstrate pure "agency" in decision-making. See id. at 37-43.
As children reach adolescence, other more non-psychoanalytic social science literature
generally describes children as beginning to "detach" from their parents, eventually
abandoning their childhood sense of parents as omnipotent and omniscient. Instead,
adolescents begin to value both parents and peers as potential sources of guidance in
decision-making, giving greater value to parent or peer influence depending on the
context. See Clay Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-PeerCross-Pressures,28 AM.
SOC. REV. 385, 385-91 (1963); Hill & Holmbeck, supra note 11; Scherer, supra note 7,
at 434.
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.14 and cmt 1.
Model Rule 1.14 states that "a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
See id. Rule 1.14. The commentary to Model Rule 1.14 explains that "[tihe client
should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions . .. to the
extent the client is willing and able to do so. See id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 1.
29. Id.
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decision-making is "impaired," and, if so, to what degree? 30 Until
recently, the social science literature examining child decision-making
has primarily focused on a person's cognitive abilities to make
decisions. 3' A common avenue for studying these abilities was to
observe how children and adults arrive at giving "informed consent,"
for example, in medical decisions. 32 A person is viewed as being
capable of giving informed consent to treatment if she can demonstrate
"an understanding of relevant disclosed information about the
treatment, ability to appreciate its relevance to one's own situation, and
an ability to use the information in comparing alternative options and in
weighing their risks and benefits in making a choice."'33
If attorneys look only to children's cognitive abilities in
investigating children's decision-making, the literature suggests that
most children have attained adult-like levels of cognitive skill by
approximately age fifteen years old. 34 Before adolescence, children
tend to process information in very concrete ways. As such, children
have difficulty with the informed consent process because they have
trouble imagining possible alternatives, and weighing each according35
to the likelihood of occurrence and normative standards of utility.
30. Id.
3 1. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (1972)
[hereinafter PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION] (describing a comprehensive
developmental model of children's cognitive processes); JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL
JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965) [hereinafter PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT] (examining
the relationship between children's cognitive development and the emergence of moral
reasoning).
3 2. See Scott et al., supra note 7,at 224-25.
33. Id. at 224. It is interesting to note that traditionally, social scientists have
analyzed informed consent to evaluate only the process of decision-making, not the
content of the outcome. Scott explains that the exclusive focus on process is consistent
with a "strong norm ... that choices about treatment should reflect the subjective values
and preferences of decision-makers .
Id.
I..."
34. See Gary B. Melton, Toward PersonhoodforAdolescents, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
99, 100 (citing T. Grisso & L. Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 412-17 (1978)) [hereinafter
Melton, Toward Personhood] ("there is no basis in . .. literature for distinguishing
adolescents age 15 and older from adults."). Michael Saks notes the importance of caseby-case determinations of competency in decision-making, given possible variations
according to subject matter and situation. For example, competence to consent to
medical treatment might involve different mental operations than competence to make a
decision regarding custody. See Michael Saks, Social Psychological Perspectives on
the Problem of Consent, in GARY B. MELTON ET AL., CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO

CONSENT 41, 50 (1983) [hereinafter MELTON Er AL., CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE (stating "if
case-by-case competence judgments are to be made the specificity of subject matter and
situation become important considerations").
35. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychological Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM.
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According to Jean Piaget and other cognitive psychologists, sometime
between the ages of eleven and fourteen years old, children have
generally reached the stage of "formal operations" where they begin to
think hypothetically in solving problems.36
A number of social scientists have found this cognitive model to
present an incomplete picture of how children develop into decisionmakers. The relevant literature has recently called for additional
concepts to be added to the analysis of how children develop into
decision-makers, including, among others, affiliative behavior.37 For
example, Professors Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman have
suggested that the inclusion of three additional psychosocial concepts,
under an expanded rubric of "maturity of judgment," may more
directly address the concerns of judges and policy-makers when issues
of child decision-making, particularly that of adolescents, arise.38
Each of the three concepts attempts to group together a number of
different psychosocial and cognitive theories. First, the concept of
responsibility in adolescence includes the adolescent's demonstrated
capacity for autonomy, independent thought, and developing ego or
249, 262-63 (1996) (examining cognitive and psychosocial factors in
children's decision-making toward the development of new conceptions of "maturity").
BEHAV.

See generally PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION, supra note 31; PIAGET, THE MORAL

supra note 31. It appears that this more cognitive approach to looking at
children's decision-making abilities is what Justice Douglas had in mind when he wrote
his famous dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972), in which he called
on the United States Supreme Court to allow the children in the case to participate in a
decision regarding their religion and education. Justice Douglas stated:
The court below brushed aside the [children's] interests with the offhand
comment that "[wihen the child reaches the age of judgment, he can choose for
But there is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and
himself ....
intellectual judgment demanded of the [child] by the question in this case is
beyond his capacity. Children far younger than the 14 and 15-year-olds
involved here are regularly permitted to testify in custody and other
proceedings. Indeed, the failure to call the affected child in a custody hearing
is often reversible error. Moreover, there is substantial agreement among
child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and intellectual maturity
of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult.
Id. at 245 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
36. See Scott et al., supra note 7, at 225. Scott notes that in recent years such "stage"
model theories have been revisited, and that the literature currently endorses a more
"collaborative" model of child reasoning. See id. That is, current science describes
children's abilities as comprised of "similar skills [which] develop at different rates in
different task domains," rather than developing distinctively at different ages and
demonstrated across tasks. Id. This "collaborative" model highlights again the
importance of examining the context in which children's decisions are made.
37. See id. (stating that "few psychologists believe that children at a given stage
engage in a characteristic reasoning across many tasks and that this process differs from
reasoning at other stages"); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 249.
38. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 249.
JUDGMENT,
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sense of identity.39 Second, the authors describe the concept of
temperance as the ability to limit impulsivity, to evaluate a situation
completely before acting, and to seek advice when needed to assist in
arriving at a decision. 4 ' Finally, the concept of perspective is
described as including the ability to recognize the complexity of a
situation, to frame a decision within a larger context, and to take the
perspective of affected others.4 '
If attorneys look to more psychosocial factors in trying to discern a
child client's decision-making ability, a far murkier picture emerges.
First, attorneys are confronted with what Professors Steinberg,
Cauffman, and other individuals have referred to as a dearth of solid
research in these areas.42 According to these authors, individual
studies of the above concepts included in this new rules of "maturity of
judgment" have tended to be flawed. For example, studies generally
look at only one aspect of several phenomenon that are probably
interrelated, such as the effect of mood on decision-making, but the
studies do not examine how this effect might change
developmentally. 43 In addition, these authors call for more research of
decision-making in the context of "real-life" situations, since most
studies in these areas have involved after-the-fact interviews and
subject responses to hypothetical questions.'
Second, when looking at the existing data, one is immediately
struck by the findings that many adolescents, even by the age of
majority, have not attained what might be deemed as "mature"
judgment. 45 In fact, it appears that in some studies, a number of adults
in their early twenties have not yet attained this level.4 6 In
39. See id. at 252.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 252, 262-63.
42. See id. at 249; see also Scott et al., supra note 7, at 221.
43. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 269.
44. See id. at 268.
45. For example, regarding the concept of responsibility, Steinberg and Cauffman
explain that "while self-examination may take place throughout adolescence, the
consolidation of a coherent sense of identity does not begin until the late teens or early
twenties. To the extent, then, that maturity of judgment goes hand in hand with
consolidation of a sense of identity, [the available] research . . . suggests that most
individuals would not be expected to display consistently mature judgment until the age
of 18, at the earliest." Id. at 255 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also supra
text accompanying note 39.
46. For example, in looking at the strength of peer and parent influences on
children's decision-making on medical and other important decisions, the research
describes deference to parents as quite powerful even up to age 24 years old. See, e.g.,
Scherer, supra note 7, at 442-43. Scherer's study did not find any significant differences
in the amount of deference given to parents in two of three hypothetical medical
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summarizing the available literature, Steinberg and Cauffman
hypothesized that there may be more differences in maturity,
particularly with respect to the two concepts of temperance and
perspective, between adolescents age sixteen and younger, and
adolescents age seventeen and older into adulthood.47 As to the
concept of responsibility, including the effect of peer and parental
influence, the authors claimed there was insufficient research to draw
definitive conclusions about age differences.'
In the area of parental and peer influence, with which this writing is
particularly concerned, Steinberg, Cauffman, and other authors
identify a number of challenges for future research on "maturity."
They point out that while research generally describes a developmental
trend of decreasing parental influence during adolescence,4 9 peer
influence follows more of a bell curve, with influence peeking at
approximately fourteen years old. 50 The authors question whether the
diminishing peer influence after fourteen is due to increased selfdirection, or possibly diminished intensity in "peer pressure."'" As
mentioned earlier, the relative strength of peer and parental influence
appears to vary depending on the context of the decision. 52
Adolescents turn to peers for guidance with more day-to-day matters,
such as fashion and dating, while they turn to parents for guidance
with more long-term matters, such as religion and education.5 3 Most
importantly, Steinberg and Cauffman question whether "maturity"
should always be equated with "independent judgment," or whether
the avoidance of social influences is even possible.-" Instead, the
authors call for greater valuation of "maturity" for decisions made with
the guidance and advice of others. 55 The authors explain, "[iindeed,
decision-making exercises involving three different age groups with mean ages of 9.8,
15.1 and 21.9 years old. See id. at 435. Interestingly, when asked for their reasons for
deferring to their parents, the younger group tended to explain that they respected their
parents' judgment. See id. at 443. The older two groups' reasons generally consisted of
either (I) they felt they would have no real choice, or (2) if they did have a choice, they
would defer to their parents anyway to avoid family tension and conflict. See id.
47. See Steinberg and Cauffman, supra note 35, at 269.
48. See id. at 258.
49. See, e.g., Thomas Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and
Parents, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 608, 608 (1979).
50. See id. (stating "age trends for conformity [with peersl were curvilinear, and peer
conformity peaked at the 6th or 9th grade").
5 i. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 254.
52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 253.
54. See id.
5 5. See id. at 254.
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one of the hallmarks of mature judgment is knowing where to turn for
advice, knowing how to solicit it, and knowing whether and to what
extent to follow it."
In summary, while the social science literature examining children's
decision-making appears to be in a state of change, important themes
are emerging that may help guide attorneys in taking direction from
their child clients. First, children's decisions clearly result from a
complex interaction of both cognitive and psychosocial factors.
Second, in trying to evaluate decision-making, there is the danger of
essentializing such that only a subset of these factors are considered to
the exclusion of others. For example, an attorney or other evaluator of
the child's decision-making skills might give determinative weight to
the perceived effects of peer or parental influence, ignoring the
possibility that the child's decision might be more a product of several
factors, including the child's sense of identity, and evaluation of risks.
As described supra, which factors are included or excluded in the
evaluation will greatly determine the answer-whether the child can
make decisions in her own interest, at age twelve, fifteen, eighteen or
older.
Finally, social science is beginning to ask important questions about
what should qualify as "mature" judgment by children. Are mature
decisions usually arrived at by "independent judgment"? Or, can
maturity also be found in children who seek others' advice, or who act
out of loyalty or deference to someone whom they have grown to
trust? With this questioning, social scientists are joined by other
scholars in law and social policy to reexamine how law treats decisionmaking, particularly children's agency and autonomy.
V. HUMAN AFFILIATION, LAW, AND THE MODEL RULES
Compared to the ambivalent treatment of affiliation in social science,
the law's response to affiliation has been confused and inflexible. As
noted by Professors Martha Minow and Martha Fineman, the law
appears unable to embrace the often interrelated phenomenon of
affiliation, dependency, and decision-making with anything but brightline rules.' The law is, of course, quite varied in the extent to which
it allows children to make decisions.' Ideally, such allowances would
56. Id.
57. See Minow, supra note 9, at 4-5; see also Martha Fineman, Dependencies,
Keynote speech delivered at Cornell Symposium on Women and Welfare (October 3,
1997).
58. See Minow, supra note 9, at 3-4 (discussing the "varied legal treatments of young
people"); Theresa Glennon and Robert Schwartz, Foreward: Looking Back, Looking
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reflect a considered judgment by the legislature or judges to grant
children autonomy commensurate with their developing abilities.
Instead, the law expressly allocates rights and responsibilities
according to children's ages rather than their abilities. For example,
the law provides that a child can be drafted and vote at age eighteen,
the "age of majority."59 In almost every state, the ability to be
prosecuted and incarcerated for adult-like criminal activity is set at an
age far below the age of majority. 60 At twenty-one years old, the law
generally gives a child autonomy to consume alcohol, and at the same
time, her parents usually are granted freedom from financial
responsibility for child support.6 '
On the other hand, where the law does not respond to affiliation,
dependence and decision-making with bright line rules, it fails to
respond at all. For example, the guidelines for attorneys in the Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility ("Model Code") and the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("Model Rules") appear to be meant for
the representation of clients who are wholly independent, autonomous
decision-makers, unmoored to or uninfluenced by their relationships. 62
This approach belies several important facts about human interaction.
First, everyone, including adults, are dependent on someone at some
time or another. 63 Second, as discussed in Sections II & III supra,
everyone occasionally makes decisions because of personal affiliations
with others, either out of deference, trust, altruism, self-sacrifice, or a
host of other motivations-each of which has the potential for
producing bad decisions.' 4 Thus, both the Model Rules and Model
Ahead: The Evolution of Children's Rights, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1557, 1561-62 (1995)

(stating "the various laws affecting children appear incoherent... ").
59. Professor Weithorn notes that the use of ages 18 and 21 to define adulthood
"stem[s] from currently irrelevant historical concerns such as sufficient physical
strength to bear heavy armor." Lois Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions
Affecting Their Own Welfare: Guidelines for Professionals, in M ELTON ET AL.,
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE, supra note 34, at 235, 239.
60. See generally PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES

TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3-9, 5 fig. 3 (1996) (describing the variety of
state initiatives in recent years addressing juvenile delinquency).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1983) (stating that parents of a
child under the age of 21 years old are chargeable with the support of the child); id. § 513
(stating that each parent of a child born out of wedlock is chargeable for the support of
that child).
62. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1405-06 (1996).
63. See Minow, supra note 9, at 15-17; Fineman, supra note 57.
64. Some individuals would argue that society actually values altruism and loyalty in

368

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

Code can be seen as inadequately cognizant of humans as social
beings.
The law generally assumes that the age of majority is the point of
transition to a new state of being whereby rational, independent choice
takes charge of decision-making.65 Once having reached majority, the
theory purports that an adult can reasonably choose whether to act on
his affiliations; that is, whether to make decisions based on any of the
above motivations.66 It is further presumed that after the age of
majority, the individual is resilient enough to resist most forms of
pressure or influence from others. 67 Most importantly, except in cases
where a person is at risk of serious harm to herself or others,' the law
tends to allow individuals age eighteen and older to make bad
decisions stemming from their affiliations with others. 69
Should the law allow some children to make bad decisions as well?
Certainly, research shows that the age of eighteen is not a magical age
for someone to become capable of making decisions. As discussed,
depending on the cognitive or psychosocial approach, for many
children the capability to make decisions develops earlier than the age
of majority, for many other children it develops at the time they reach
majority, and for some children it may never happen at all. 70 The
Model Rules, as previously noted, provide a sliding scale approach
that allows the attorney to adjust the amount of decision-making
authority given to the client according to the attorney's assessment of
the client's ability to make informed decisions that further her best

some people more than others. For example, arguably females receive greater
encouragement for exhibiting these traits while males are more often praised for
demonstrating independence and toughness. Cf CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 159-60 (1982); Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (1988).
65. See Weithom, supra note 59, at 239. But see TORBET El AL, supra note 60, at 3-9
(describing the trend of states to remove jurisdiction of cases of serious and violent
juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system to the adult criminal court's
jurisdiction with the result that most states prosecute and punish children as adults for
adult-like crime, and, by implication, deem them capable of rational, independent
choice).
66. See id. See, for example, the United States Supreme Court majority opinion of
Amish children's interest in making decisions about their religion and education in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67. See Scherer, supra note 7, at 455.
68. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof that finds dangerousness to self and others is required for
involuntary commitment).
69. See generally Steinberg and Cauffman, supra note 35, at 249.
70. See id.; see also Hill & Holmbeck, supra note 11.
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interests. 7
For child clients, however, the attorney usually
approaches this assessment with several assumptions, each of which is
likely to result in the child being deemed an impaired decision-maker
because she does not fit the traditional model of the independently
minded, autonomous adult. One assumption is that children are
economically dependent on their parents, therefore, they are unlikely to
make decision that might create economic uncertainty. Another
assumption is that children are emotionally dependent on their parents,
thus they are unlikely to make decisions that might jeopardize that
relationship. As observed by this author in practice, these
assumptions manifest themselves in a number of attorney "rules-ofthumb." For example, situations arise in which the parent is pressing
for a particular outcome in court that the attorney believes is contrary to
the child's best interests. If the parent strongly believes that this
outcome is best and the child expresses the same or similar opinion, it
is likely that the attorney will deem the child's decision-making as
impaired due to assumed parental pressure.'
The same difficulties related to affiliation, albeit in more restricted
forms, arise in adult decision-making. For example, adult workers'
dependency on their jobs can result in poor decision-making to please
employers and to ensure greater job security. Similarly, most adults
would be loathe to make a decision that could disrupt an important
interpersonal relationship. How many adults likely make decisions,
particularly bad decisions, to please parents, spouses, lovers, friends,
or even their children?
It should be noted that when children act in ways consistent with
their dependency, whether emotional or economical, they may be
exhibiting very sound decision-making processes, the same kind of
processes adults employ in their more "autonomous" relationships
with others. 73 Advocates should want their clients to have close bonds
with their parents because society generally desires children to take
direction from parents, even when there may be some dysfunction
present in the parent-child relationship. 74 Our society depends upon
71. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, supra note 2, Rule 1.14.
72. Note that it would be unlikely that the attorney would find the child impaired,
despite overt parental pressure on the child, if the parent's desired result is perceived as
consistent with the child's best interests.
73. Once a child acquires the cognitive ability to make decisions analogous to that of
an adult, there still may be some ways that the child's decision-making will differ from
the adult's. For example, a child who has recently acquired these abilities will not have
experience utilizing them to the extent adults have.
74. See, e.g., In re Jeannette S., 156 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (denying
removal of a child from her parent even where poor parenting is present, because
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children developing new abilities and perspectives in the context of
their interdependency. In fact, it is usually very difficult for any child,
even an adult child, to be immune from parental influence.75
Advocates generally want children to act out of "love" and respect
for their parents and others. However, advocates take great pause
when it is recognized that sometimes "love" can blind, preventing the
consideration of alternative options, and sometimes beckoning children
(and adults) to place their personal needs second. To the extent that
such adult-like behavior in children is considered impaired decisionmaking, there is cause for concern regarding the message this sends to
children-about the value of responding with self-sacrifice to a loved
one's needs, or deferring to the judgment of someone with whom they
have a close relationship.
Again, this dilemma illustrates how the law and current attorney
ethical codes offer little guidance to the child's attorney. Moreover, in
requiring compliance, the ethical codes force the child's attorney into a
false choice of finding a client either autonomous (i.e. "unimpaired")
or dependent (i.e. "impaired"). 76 The above analysis, however,
reveals a much more complex reality. Some children's decisions are
influenced by love, loyalty, and respect for a parent, in similar fashion
to the way adults' decisions are influenced by their intimate
relationships These influences are akin to the influence of intimate
relationships on decisions made by adults. Where a decision poses a
potential risk to the child, some children will have a different, yet
reasonable, assessment of that risk, on which reasonable people may
differ. In the above instances, the determining factor for the state to
override a child's decision would not be poor decision-making, but
rather the desire to protect children from the consequences of what, in
hindsight, might be regarded as a bad decision. Whether this factor
constitutes a legitimate state interest is questionable, especially because
of the flawed message about decision-making that is sent to the
competent child. If a valid state interest could be identified in saving
removal is a drastic remedy given the vital human relationship between parent and
child).

75. See Garbarino, supra note 10, at 40-66 (discussing various stages of the
development of independent decision making); MELTON Er AL., CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE,

supra note 34, at 24-25; also Scherer, supra note 7.
76. The law's tendency to dichotomize in this fashion, rather than to recognize
human interdependence and gradations of dependency, has likely resulted in
displacement of adult dependency onto children. Similar dichotomization appears in,
other contexts where the law has difficulty accounting for interdependence, for example,
the use of the battered women's syndrome as a defense. See generally Mahoney, supra
note 7.
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competent children from the risk of making a bad decision, even where
reasonable people would disagree about the proper choice, an attorney
or the state who appointed him could validly decide to withhold the
recognition of the child's autonomy. In the tradition of such concepts
as "guilty, but mentally ill," one could hypothesize the use of the term
"competent, but not given autonomy. 77 The use of the term
"impairment," with all the serious ramifications for the attorney-client
relationship, should be limited to those child clients who are incapable
of making decisions, either due to cognitive deficits, parental pressure,
or role-reversal.
How might attorney-child client relationships change under this
scenario? First, the child's attorney would need to take a more serious
approach in getting to know the child in context. 78 This would require
the attorney to learn about the child's affiliations with her parents and
others without the presumption that affiliation necessarily governs and
impairs decision-making. The attorney should get to know the child's
unique tendencies as a decision-maker in different contexts by
interviewing parents, teachers, counselors, and others with knowledge
about the child. If there is no counselor present, it may be appropriate
for the child to have one, depending on her needs. Such a counselor
would be invaluable in helping the attorney sort out the extent to which
the influence of parents and other individuals, as well as other
variables, are affecting the child's decision-making ability for better or
for worse. 79 Even when the child does not need a counselor, a child's
77. Recognizing that there might be instances when a competent child (or adult) is
being unduly influenced, one could suggest a more systemic change: recognition of a
category of situations where the decisions of people unduly influenced (children
included) should not be honored. This change would require additional study of adult
legal concepts such as duress, undue influence, and diminished capacity, as well as reexamination of the legally-recognized defense of battered women's syndrome. See
generally Mahoney, supra note 7. In the interim, this author suggests a smaller step
(possibly a major one) for attorneys-to take direction from a competent child client
who is not "unduly influenced," but only behaving consistently with her affiliative
relationship with her parent.
78. For an excellent and detailed analysis of how a child's attorney should work to
create an effective attorney-client relationship, see JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS (1997). In this Article, the suggestions
about how to deal with the child's affiliations and its implications for the attorneyclient relationship are meant to supplement Professor Peter's writings about ethical and
sound practices for children's attorneys.
79. See generally Duquette, supra note 26. Given the relative newness of the social
sciences' analysis of "maturity," it could be helpful for the child's attorney to inquire as
to the mental health professional's knowledge and view of this literature. In this regard,
the articles by Steinberg and Cauffman, supra note 35, Scott et al., supra note 7, and
Scherer, supra note 7, would be particularly helpful. A mental health professional in a
counseling relationship with a child or family can also play an essential role in
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attorney should have access to a mental health professional on either a
formal or informal basis, particularly for purposes of assessing the
child's abilities and interests.80 As discussed earlier, an attorney who
relies solely on his lay abilities to discern a child's decision-making is
prone to following his own presumptions about children as decisionmakers instead of informed revelations about his client's decisionmaking abilities.
Once an adequate atmosphere for counseling is established, a major
portion of such counseling should involve practicing and evaluating
decision-making with the child.8' The attorney should find out about
the child's desires and concerns, as well as what the child believes
would be the best outcome for the proceeding. Then the attorney
should again give the child an opportunity to practice decision-making
by slightly changing the facts, particularly where there are likely to be
disputes of fact in the court proceeding, and ask the child to consider
the effect on her decision. The attorney can role-play with the client by
having the child take her parent's role, or by having the attorney take
the judge's role, and hypothesizing an interaction in which the child's
wishes or best interests are discussed. The attorney may also want to
try hypothesized changes of fact and role-playing related to affiliated
issues.' Examples of these hypotheticals might be: "What if your Dad
called me tomorrow and said, 'Look, I'd be really upset if my kid
wants to live with her mom.' Would that change what you want to do?
Pretend your dad could join in your regular counseling session, and he
asked you to explain what you want. What would you say? What
would that be like for you?"
Finally, where issues of risk assessment may be important, it is
useful for the attorney to play the role of a very skeptical judge,
monitoring and intervening when either a parent or other influences on the child begin
to impair the child's judgment and harm the child's emotional health.
80. See generally Duquette, supra note 26.
81. This evaluation and practice could occur after the attorney provides an
explanation of his role, assurances of confidentiality, and a description of the client's
reasonable expectations regarding confidentiality and how decisions will be made in the
attorney-client relationship in language that the child can understand. See generally
PETERS, supra note 78; William Kell, Voices Lost and Found: Training Ethical Lawyers
for Children, IND L.J. (forthcoming winter 1998).
82. The child's counselor would likely be extremely helpful in identifying possible
inquiries, both in terms of questions and format. Whenever needed, the counselor should
also advise the attorney against using such counseling and evaluative strategies when it
would be too difficult, emotionally or otherwise, for the child. The author has had
occasions where it was helpful to sit in on the child's regular session with her counselor
(with both client and counselor consent). During these sessions it was useful to conduct
some of the above evaluation and counseling in the presence of the counselor.
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unwilling to take chances. Following this approach, the attorney
might ask the child: "Explain to me the best you can why you do not
think there is a risk if your return home-make your best argument."
If after making these efforts, there continues to be a question of risk
upon which reasonable people may differ, the attorney should treat the
child who demonstrates adequate decision-making as one of those
reasonable people.
Consider again Delia's case and the pending motion to end further
state oversight with her family. Assume that the attorney interviewed
and counseled Delia, and talked to her counselor, teacher, and others
about her decision-making ability. In addition, the attorney would
have to assess the risk to the child client of supporting the dismissal by
talking to the DSS caseworker, additional family, family friends, and
other individuals with knowledge of the child's situation. Such
assessment would include consideration of the extent to which
continued state involvement would be either beneficial or harmful.
Assume after this inquiry that the child's attorney believes the
following: (1) Delia's cognitive decision-making abilities are basically
sound; (2) Delia is very close to her parents, and out of love and
concern she wants to spare them further discomfort from dealing with
DSS; 83 (3) there is little or no evidence of overt parental pressure or
role-reversal; and (4) reasonable people could disagree about the risk
assessment to Delia if State oversight ended. On these bases, the
attorney would properly find that Delia was capable of making
decisions on her own behalf, and that she should have membership in
the group of "reasonable people" who could disagree about the
potential risk to her if State involvement in her family's life ceased.
Similarly, the attorney would view Delia's decision, with its
components of love and concern for her parents, not as demonstrating
incapacity, but rather as exhibiting aspects of altruism and loyalty that
are equally desirable in adults. 84 Thus, according to the Model Rules,
the attorney would need to take direction from his client and support
the motion for dismissalY
83. Delia may also identify with her parents as possible victims of racial
discrimination, and may desire, out of loyalty, to speak out against what she perceives
to be unjust treatment.
84. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
85. Alternatively, the attorney could suggest other options to the child client that
might address her desires and have a greater chance at success. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 2.1. For example, because the judge can
deny the dismissal request on the basis that the child's best interests require it, the
attorney might develop, with the client's consent, an alternative arrangement for DSS
involvement, e.g., a motion for suspended judgment. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§
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A different result should follow if Delia's attorney discovered signs
of parental pressure, of an amount beyond the child's ability to resist.
If Delia's father, for example, had threatened similar harm to her for
non-cooperation, or if he had misled her about the risks of further DSS
involvement, and if the attorney perceived that consequently Delia felt
constrained in her choices, then the attorney would need to assume a
role more akin to a de facto guardian.'
The attorney's inquiry should be twofold: was a threat or other
parental pressure applied, and what was the child client's ability to
resist or weather the pressure. Finally, if pressure, role-reversal, or
other potentially harmful parent-child affiliation is found, the attorney
should take all steps to try and shield the child client from further
exposure, though the assistance of the judge and any counselor for the
child for family.
VI. CHILDREN LEARNING ABOUT DECISION-MAKING AND
REPRESENTATION

Until social science scholarship and the law can provide more
guidance about children's decision-making, attorneys will need to
proceed cautiously in determining when to take direction from the child
client. In the meantime, the approach described herein should feel
familiar, as it relies on attorneys and judges maintaining their distinct
roles. When children can count on attorneys to act like attorneys and
judges to act like judges, children can truly have the opportunity to be
empowered by representation commensurate with their emerging
decision-making abilities. In addition, these children will be able to
meaningfully participate in decisions that affect them and to practice
sound decision-making processes with the effective assistance of
counsel.
Under this approach, many child advocates and policy-makers
might raise concerns about possible increased risks for children, and
1052-53 (McKinney 1983). By entering a suspended judgment, the court, in its order,
could identify a certain date when DSS would discontinue interference into the family's
life. Assuming family compliance with monitoring, in the interim DSS would gradually
make fewer visits up to the date ordered by the court. In addition, the attorney and client
could explore whether there might be others whom DSS might agree to use as a monitor,
e.g., the school social worker. Finally, the parties might agree to a settlement whereby
there would be no visits to the home, but instead Delia's teacher and counselor would
provide the court with status reports. If these reports raised no further concerns, the
court could enter a dismissal order at the end of the adjournment'period.
86. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.14. Instead,
the attorney could also request the additional appointment of GAL for the client. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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that these risks might outweigh any possible benefits derived from
allowing more children to make decisions and direct their
representation. It should be noted that once the attorney finds that
reasonable people could disagree as to the existence of risk, it does not
incrementally increase that risk for the attorney to follow the competent
client's decision versus the attorney's own assessment. Ultimately,
the final decision is not the child client's or the attorney's, but that of
the judge. The judge is, of course, free to ignore the child client's
competent decision, and should do so in favor of another result if it
conflicts with the judge's determination of the child's best interests.
This proposed approach only changes the behavior of attorneys. Once
the attorney finds the child competent, however, the attorney should
not have the same freedom as the judge to ignore her client's wishes.
The potential benefit of this approach is to increase the number of
situations where children's competent decisions are honored.
Professors Melton, Weithorn and others identify important public
interests in encouraging children to exercise their developing decisionmaking abilities. 87 The acclaimed Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky
describes children as having a certain level of competency, but having
the ability to achieve higher levels of competency with the assistance of
a "teacher." 88 Such a teacher can work to expand what Vygotsky
refers to as the child's "zone of proximal development,"89 through
patient listening, questioning, and providing additional instruction.'
Clearly, the Model Rules hold out the promise of a similar model,
describing how adults (and children) can achieve new levels of
empowerment and competency when facing legal problems with the

87. See generally Melton, Toward Personhood,supra note 34, at 99. The Sub-task
Panel on Infants, Children and Adolescents of the President's Commission on Mental
Health called for "youth participation as a sound strategy to enable young people to
undertake responsible and rewarding involvement in the adult world." See Weithorn,
supra note 59, at 241 (quoting SUB-TASK PANEL ON INFANTS, CHILDREN, AND
ADOLESCENTS, REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON MENTAL HEALTH AND AMERICAN FAMILIES

No. 040-000-00392-4 (1978)). Echoing this sentiment, Professor Weithorn asserts:
Involving children in decisions that affect their welfare affords them a
learning opportunity that better prepares them for future joint or independent
decision-making.
Involving children in such decisions respects the
autonomy, individuality, and privacy of each child, and may increase the
children's sense of themselves as active and responsible participants in their
own care, rather than powerless victims of the whims of adults.
Weithorn, supra note 59, at 241.
88. See L.S. VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 98-118 (Eugenia Hanfmann &
Gertrude Vakar eds., 1965).
89. See id. at 103-05.
90. See id.
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help of their attorneys. 9' Consistent with this role and with the need
for improved research on child decision-making, attorneys should also
seek ways to collaborate with social scientists to develop innovative
92
and more accurate ways of evaluating child decision-making.
VII. CONCLUSION

Traditional legal ethical frameworks do not give adequate guidance
for children's attorneys in dealing with parent-child affiliation. This
lack of adequate guidance exists because such frameworks treat human
beings as dispassionate, wholly rational decision-makers divorced
from relationships that might affect the decision-making process.
Such a conception inaccurately describes adults and children, it also
potentially invalidates all children as potential decision-makers
regardless of ability. Although children's attorneys need to continue to
monitor and combat parent-child affiliation reflecting parental pressure
or harmful role-reversal, the attorney should not dismiss the competent
child as "impaired" when she makes decisions colored by her close
relationships. Where reasonable people could disagree as to what is in
the child's best interests, there is no valid reason to prevent the
competent child from directing her representation, other than to
paternalistically shield the child from the risks of having to live with a
decision deemed bad in hindsight. If the attorney still feels compelled
to shield the child, he should do so honestly, not by finding
"impairment" where there is no reasonable basis to distinguish the
child's affiliative behavior from an adult's. After counseling the child
and advising her on the best course of action, if the competent child
chooses a different path out of affiliation for others, the attorney
should honor his duty to take direction from the child. The attorney
should defer to state interest in protecting the competent child client
from bad decisions to the judge. A child's agency must leave room for
affiliative relationships, just as an adult's agency does. Although
family ties can bind, attorneys need to learn how children's affiliations
can also enable children to become the kind of decision-makers society
expects them to be.

91. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Preamble §§ 1-12
(describing how attorneys are to empower clients).
92. See generally Steingberg & Cauffman, supra note 35, at 268.

